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This paper compares an adversarial view of World Bank-
borrower relations with a cooperative view. The
adversarial view leads to a principal-agent model where a
portion of implementation problems arise because World Bank
information about borrower actions is incomplete. The
importance of information links the monitoring component of
World Bank supervision to project performance. In
contrast, asymmetric information plays no role in the
cooperative view; implementation problems are purely
technical and hence the role of World Bank supervision is
less clear. The paper outlines the different empirical
predictions of the two views and highlights policy
implications for the design and supervision of development
projects.1
The past decade has witnessed both an expansion in the
number of world Bank funded projects and a decline in the
performance of these projects. This apparent trend has
renewed the focus on project performance and its
determinants and with some urgency since the performance of
World Bank funded projects -- some 1,850 representing 5140
billion dollars in lending -- is of no small consequence to
the prospects for less development countries. The degree
to which a project achieves its potential contribution to a
country's economic development is critically dependent on
how well the project is implemented. Although
implementation is the responsibility of the borrowing
government or its agencies, one quarter of World Bank
operational staff time, at a cost of roughly ~170 million a
year, is spent supervising projects under implementation.
This paper examines the sources of implementation
problems by comparing an adversarial view of World Bank-
borrower interaction with a cooperative view. Theae views
have different implications for project performance and,
specifically, for the role of World Bank supervision in
determining project performance. The emphasis of this
paper is on identifying empirically testable differences
between the two views.
The adversarial model identifies an agency problem
between the World Bank and its borrowers. Borrowers face a
moral hazard. Their objectives differ from those of the
world Bank, which are embodied in the project plan on which
lending i~ based. The borrower thus has an incentive to
deviate from the plan to the extent possible given the .
World Bank's limited ability to observe borrower actions.
From the World Bank's point of view, these deviations cause
implementation problems and lower project performance.
World Bank disbursement mechanisms and project supervision
can be seen as attempts to mitigate this agency problem.
The degree to which World Bank and borrower objectives2
differ (and the extent to which World Bank preferences
dominate the project selection and design process) varies
across countries and project types. These characteristics
may measure the severity of the agency problem. The
monitoring component of World Bank superviaion is expected
to improve project performance by reducing the incentive to
deviate; hence, World Bank supervision may have a greater
impact when incentives to deviate are greater.
In the cooperative model of World Bank-borrower
interactions, there are no intentional deviations from the
project plan. Differential information about borrower
actions is irrelevant. In this setting, implementation
problems are purely technical difficulties; performance is
determined by how many such difficulties arise and how well
they are solved. World Bank supervision is characterized
as assistance and is expected to have a poaitive (though
variable) impact on project performance. However, in
contrast to the supervision-as-monitoring interpretation,
subatitutes exist for World Bank supervision-as-assistance.
Since such asaistance improves borrower welfare (again in
contrast to monitoring), the borrower will supplement World
Bank supervision. The overall level of assistance is not
determined by the level of World Bank supervision. As a
result, there may be no observable link between the
asaistance components of World Bank supervision and project
performance.
Section I provides a brief description of World Bank
lending procedures and the project cycle. Section II
presents the adversarial interpretation, identifying World
Bank-borrower interactions as those of a principal and an
agent. Section III outlines the cooperative
interpretatiOn. Both sections II and III enumerate
implications for project performance in general and for the
role of supervision in particular. The concluding section
summarizes the differencea between the two views and the3
two sets of implications. I close with a broader view,
suggesting methods for minimizing implementation problems
by reducing the scope of agency problems in World Bank
project lending.4
I. World Bank Procedures and the Project Cycle
This section presents a simplified description of
World Bank lending procedures and the project cycle and
discussea measures of project performance. I draw on Baum
(1982) most heavily but also on other sources and on
conversations with World Bank staff. The deacription of
World Bank procedures is cursory, only providing details
which are critical for underatanding arguments presented
later in the paper. I focus on mechanics and how the World
Bank influences project selection and design, gathers
information, and attempts to control implementation. The
order of presentation follows the standard project cycle
chronology: planning, implementation, and evaluation.
Planning
Planning is further subdivided into identification,
preparation, appraisal, negotiation and board approval.
These stages are best explaíned with an example.'
Suppose a region of the borrowing country experiences
periodic floods and draughts. A dam and irrigation system
may be identified as beneficial because it provides
protection from floods and increases agricultural output.
In addition, the project may fit well with World Bank
economic and sectoral plana for the country and with World
Bank lending targets. During the identification phase,
costa and benefits are based on preliminary engineering and
cost estimates.
The preparation phase involves more detailed planning,
engineering feasibility atudies, determination of costs to
20 percent accuracy, eatimation of benefits and their
distribution (via sectoral studies), and identification of
For a better example, aee Encarnacion et al. (1982), an informative
caee etudy of world Bank project preparation.5
sources of financing.~ Timetables for project
implementation are prepared using scheduling and critical
path techniques. In the proposed irrigation project,
preparation includes determining the exact location and
size of the dam and irrigation system, the costs of
construction and maintenance, and the benefits from reduced
flooding and increased output. An engineering firm would
complete a plan for constructing the dam and irrigation
system. Studies would be commissioned to determine the
rate of salinization and its potential effect on output,
the adaptability of local crop varieties to irrigation, the
market for the increased output, etc. All the details of
project implementation are spelled out in a project brief
which the borrower officially submits to the World Bank
though there is substantial involvement of World Bank staff
throughout identification and preparation.
The third phase of planning is project appraisal, a
critical evaluation of the project plan by World Bank staff
and consultants. Projects are analyzed on technical,
institutional, economic and financial grounds. Appraisal
often includes cost-benefit analysis and the calculation of
an expected economic rate of return. The expected economic
rate of return must be above a threshold (a minimum of ten
percent in most cases) for the project to be recommended;
risk or sensitivity analysis should also be carried out
though in practice often is not. Originally, when
identification and preparation did not involve the World
Bank, appraisal was an "outside" evaluation which could
reject the proposed project. Currently, "because of the
[World) Bank's close involvement in identification and
The World Bank typically finances all foreign exchange needs
including the estimated foreign exchange content of domestic goods
and services. The World Bank may provide additional financing for
poorer countries. Thirty-six percent of World Bank funding is
disbursed locally (average for 1948 to 1991; World Bank, p.80, Table
4-4). Some projecta include financing from other international
institutions. The majority of domeatic funds come from the domestic
government budget.6
preparation, appraisal rarely results in rejection of a
project; but it may be extensively modified or redesigned
during this process to correct flaws that otherwise might
have led to its rejection." (Baum, 1982, p. 17) Appraisal
results are presented in a staff appraisal report which
places the project in the context of domestic economic
conditions and on-going World Bank involvement. The staff
appraisal report is a starting point for negotiations with
the borrower.
The negotiation phase usually establishes key legal
covenants and timetables for important aspects of project
implementation. Negotiations are described in Baum:
Negotiations are a process of give and take on
both sides of the table. The [World] Bank, for
its part, must learn to adapt its general
policies to what can reasonably be accomplished
in the country, the sector, and the particular
setting of the project. The borrower, for its
part, must recognize that the [World] Bank's
advice is generally based on professional
expertise and worldwide experience, and that the
[World] Bank's requirement that its funds be
inveated wisely ia compatible with the best
interesta of the project. ( Baum, 1982, p.18)
In our irrigation example, the World Bank and the borrower
might discuss the charge for water, the timing of progress
reports, the diatribution pattern and region covered, the
inclusion of a hydro-electric station and fishery, etc.
Any changes are incorporated in the ataff appraisal report
and reflected in legal agreements. Theae documents rather
than the borrower's project bríef are presented to the
World Bank board of directors for approval.'
Throughout the planning process, the World Bank has
considerable input and hence considerable influence on the
Board approval ia almoat certain due to a pre-aelection process
which eliminates or modifiea projecta. The board expreasea opinions
while considering projects; managers pay cloae attention to theae
comments and tailor aubsequent projects accordingly.resulting project plan. As indicated earlier, the World
Bank has gradually become more involved in identification
and preparation. Baum writes:
In the earlier years, project identification was
done ad hoc, largely in response to proposals by
governments and borrowers. Over the years, the
[world] Bank has encouraged and helped borrowing
countries to develop their own capabilities and
has also strengthened its own methods of project
generation. Economic and sector analyses carried
out by the [World] Bank provide a framework for
evaluating national and sectoral policies and
problems and an understanding of the development
potential of the country. (Baum, 1982, p. 6)
The process of identification is described as complex,
involving both World Bank and borrower input. Similarly,
in the preparation of the project plan documents,
"experience has shown that the [World] Bank must have an
active role in ensuring a timely flow of well-prepared
projects... There are even exceptional circumstances in
which the (world] Bank itself does preparatory work."
(Baum, 1982, p. e) Appraisal, which involves only World
Bank staff and consultants, also influences the project
plan since the resulting staff appraisal report serves as
the basis of negotiations and is the main blue-print during
project implementation and evaluation. Considering all the
stages together, it is clear that the world Bank has
significant input into the selection and design of
projects.
Implementation
The implementation period officially begins with World
Bank board approval. An account for the amount of the loan
is created; funds are disbursed from that account on
verification of acceptable statements of expense.
Borrowers must adhere to guidelines for purchases,
contracting, and international competitive bidding. Mosta
World Bank project loans disburse gradually rather than as
a lump-sum.
All World Bank staff and consultant time spent
administering the project during implementation is termed
supervision. Supervision includes monitoring, management
advising and technical assistance, though monitoring is the
main activity. Monitoring takes place both in Washington,
D.C. (where staff examine progress reports, statements of
expense, and requests for disburaement) and during
"missiona" to the borrowing country (where staff gather
information and discuss implementation issues with
government officials). World Bank operations ataff spend
about one quarter of their time on aupervision; the average
project receives twelve staff weeks of supervision
annually.'
Each year during project implementation, the World
Bank manager in charge of overseeing a project (the task
manager) rates the project's performance on a scale of 1
(good) to 4(bad). Ratings are reviewed by higher
management and country teams, then submitted to the Central
Operationa Department for its Annual Review of
Implementation and Supervision (ARIS).5 At about the same
time, staff muat estimate supervision requirements for the
following year. Allocation of supervision is guided by
hiatorical coefficients and the specific needs of the
project.ó
An eatimated one third of supervieion ie procurement related (i.e.,
zelated to proceeaing requeste for diebursement of loan funds
following procurement of project inpute or providing assistance in
complying with World Bank procurement procedures such ae
international competitive bidding). Seventy percent of supervieion
time is logged at the World Hank headquartera in Waehington, D.C.,
and thirty percent `on miseion` in the borrowing country.
Prioz to 1986, the rating wae on a ecale of 1 to 3. S[arting in
fiecal 1992, the title hae been changed to Annual Review of
Portfolio Perfozmance (ARPP).
Hietorical coefficienta are guidelines based on the paet average
levela of aupervieion for projects by region, eector, and atage of
implemen[ation.9
Evaluation
The ex post evaluation phase actually begins before
the end of implementation as staff involved with
implementation prepare a project completion report.' The
report summarizes implementation experiences and may
include a recalculated expected economic rate of return.
These reports are submitted to the Operations Evaluation
Department, a semi-autonomous ex post auditing unit which
reports to the board of directors. Operationa Evaluation
may "pass-through" the project completion report or audit
the project. The audit rate is approximately 40 percent,
though the rate varies by type of project (e.g., the audit
rate is 100 percent for structural adjustment operations).
Audits do not specifically target unsatisfactory projects.
Regardless of passed-through or audit, the Operations
Evaluation Department issues an official rating of
satisfactory or unsatisfactory for every project. The
rating may differ from that in the project completion
report if the evaluators' opinion differs from the
implementors'.B A ten percent expected economic rate of
return rule is the primary rule for determining the rating
when such a return has been calculated, though, in
practice, the reported expected economic rate of return may
not agree with this rule.'
All supervision figures exclude time allocated for preparation of
project completion reporta.
In the most recent Annual Review of Evaluation Resulta, ten percent
of project completion report ratings were switched from eatisfactory
to unsatisfactory. (Operations Evaluation Department, 1993)
This is the case in electrification projects, for example, where
actual electric tariffs are used in cost-benefit calculationa even
though the value of electricity is clearly higher. Rather than
correct this practice, a lower rate of return threshold is used. if
the economic rate of return in the project completion report appears
inflated, Operatione Evaluation may aimply give an unsatisfactory
rating without explicitly recalculating the economic zate of return.
For this reason, ratings tend to be better measures of performance
and are more widely used for asaesaing overall World Bank
performance.10
The procedures described above apply to most World
Bank project lending regardleas of the source of funds or
the terms of the loan agreement.'o Somewhat less than one-
third of World Bank lending is funded by money from the
International Development Association (IDA). "IDA credits"
typically have very concessionary terms: 50 year repayment
period, 10 year grace period, and no interest.
Availability of IDA credits is limited; eligibility for IDA
borrowing depends primarily on the level of GDP per capita.
The other two-thirds of World Bank lending is funded by the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD). The typical terms for IBRD loans are: 20 year
repayment period, 5 year grace period, and 8 to 10 percent
interest. Some countries are eligible for both types of
funding and may have "blend" or "hybrid" projects funded by
both sources.
When all fees and interest payments are considered,
the cost of borrowing IBRD funds is about ten percent and
the cost of IDA funds is one to two percent. Despite this
difference, the ten percent economic rate of return rule
for rating projects is applied to both IDA and IBRD funded
projects. This universal application of the lOg rule is to
prevent the IDA portfolio from becoming "worse" than the
IBRD portfolio.
Finally, whether considering interim performance
ratings or final performance, project performance is
independent of loan performance. Two featurea insure this
independence. First, loan repayment is contractually
separated from project performance: the borrowing country
muat guarantee repayment regardless of project outcome.
Failure to repay has broad implications for the borrowing
:o The staff are aleo the same. Special programs auch as disaster
relief may follow accelerated procedures. Structural adjustment
operations disburse in two or more tranches. Tranche disbursement
is baeed on eatisfying policy conditionalities or macroeconomic
goals. Projects in the financial sector (such as export banks and
development finance corporations) may have different disbursement
procedures.11
country. Re-enforcing this separation, project performance
is assessed before substantial loan repayment begins. The
ex post evaluation is typically before the ten year mark at
which point only a small fraction of the loan has come due.
For these reasons, project performance is distinct from
loan performance."
Implementation takes an average of l years; OED evaluation is
usually within two or three years of project completion. Up to
evaluation, relatively li[tle is repaid becauee of a lengthy grace
period, long amortization, and low interest ratea. Repayment and
performance statistics underacore the separation of project and loan
performance: over the past two decadee, nearly 25 percent of
projects were judged unsatisfactory while less than 5 percent of
loans were non-performing. Non-pezforming loana are linked to
countries rather than projects, i.e., countries which default on
World Bank loans typically default on their entire portfolio at
once. Countries which do not repay World Bank loans are excluded
from IMF facilities and international commercial loans, including
import~export financing.12
II. The Adversarial Model
This section takes an adversarial view of World Bank-
borrower relations and describes the interactions of the
World Bank and its borrowers as those of a principal and an
agent. I first identify necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of an agency problem and then
illustrate how World Bank-borrower interactiona fit these
conditions, drawing on the description in Section I. The
existence of an agency problem provides an explanation of
the role of World Bank supervision and how it improves
performance as well as predicting a relation between
several other country ~ project characteristics and project
performance .'Z
The two actors in a príncipal-agent contract are the
principal who wishes to have something done and the agent
who agrees to do it. An agency problem is the result of
three conditions: 1) the contracting parties have
different objectives; 2) the principal's information about
the agent's action is incomplete or imperfect; and 3)
"extreme" contracts are excluded. Incomplete information
may be the optimal choice because the cost of collecting
additional information outweighs the expected benefits or
may be the result of exogenous institutional constraints on
monitoring. Similarly, extreme contracts may be dominated
by "interior solutiona" or may be outside the institutional
bounds.
All three elements of an agency problem are evident in
the familiar case of a sharecropping contract between a
landlord and an agricultural laborer. Both are depicted as
maximizing their utility, the landlord by maximizing his
ahare of the harvest net of monitoring costs, the laborer
" Although I examine the World Bank and ita borrowera, the diacusaion
appliea to any aid donor-aid recipient relationahip. In addition,
all referencee to eupervision in this section should be equated with
donor monitoring of recipient actiona.13
by balancing the marginal utility of his share of the
harvest against the marginal disutility of expending effort
in cultivating the crop. Even with a sharing contract
which aligns income objectives, additional differences
arise from the laborer's dislike of effort. The landlord
can only imperfectly observed the laborer's actions (via
the relative size of the harvest or some limited direct
monitoring) because monitoring the laborer's actions
precisely is prohibitively expensive or contrary to social
norms. Finally, extreme contracts -- renting or selling
land, wage labor, and landlord labor -- are excluded: the
first is inefficient due to the landlord's auperior risk-
bearing ability and the laborer's capital constraints; the
second is dominated by a sharing contract because of the
cost of information; and the final contract (no contract)
may be dominated by some contract involving hired labor or
may be restricted by social norms (the extreme case being a
caste system).
If any of the three conditions do not hold, the agency
problem vanishes. Again, in the case of a landlord and an
agricultural laborer, if the landlord and the laborer have
the same objectives (e.g., the laborer likea to work), a
first best optimal can be reached. If the landlord has
complete information, a forcing contract can be written.
Finally, if the landlord sells the land or provides his own
labor, there is no principal-agent contract (though the
outcome may be inferior to a full information outcome).
Conversely, if all three conditions hold, an agency problem
exiats."
World Bank lending contracts can be viewed as
principal-agent contracts where the World Bank is the
" I.e., these are the necessary and aufficient conditiona. There are
ceztainly other formulatione of these conditions. The third
condition makea explicit aesumptiona which are implicit in moat
agency diecuseions.14
principal and the borrowing government is the agent.l' The
World Bank has certain objectives and chooses to "employ"
the borrower as an agent to implement (some of) these
objectives. The World Bank's objectives include a high
level of performance in the project and a low cost while
the "payment" to the borrower is disbursement of funds and
possibly continued interaction in the future. The borrower
maximizes project performance and funds disbursed but has
other potentially conflicting objectives -- such as
diversion of project resources or a different distribution
of project benefits -- which arise from a different
assessment of performance. Following the vocabulary of the
literature, I refer to this as minimizing effort.
This is a standard agency model.15 But does the World
Bank-borrower relationship satisfy the three conditions of
a principal-agent relationship? I address each condition
in turn, starting with differences in objectives.
II.1 Florld Baak, Borrower and Project Objectivss
Why might World Bank and borrower objectivea differ?
Equivalently, why might World Bank and borrower rankings of
At the moat abstract level, the agent is the nexus of control in the
borroving country: the electorate, the dictator, or the military.
However, there are agency problema at all levele of project
implementation. Rather than attempting to deacribe a hierarchical
eyatem of principala and agents, I view machinations below the top
level as an uncertain implementation technology, the outcome of
which ia affected by the agent's effort level. This argument is
reminiacent of Edith Penrose'e central tenet in The Theory of the
Growth of the Firm: any outcome ie ultimately the reaponsibility of
the higheat level of management regardleea of the circumatancea.
Likewiae, I treat the World Bank ae a single actor. I asaume that
the "head" of the World Bank has designed incentivea for individual
employeea which are compatible with implementing World Bank goala.
Foz thie analyeis, I aeaume that internal agency problema are lesa
important than the agency problem between the World Bank and its
borrovera. Gauthier (1990) and Mosely et al. (1986) alao [reat the
world Bank and borrowers monolíthically.
,s There are, however, two unuaual featurea about the World Bank-
borrower relationahip Lhat diatinguiah i[ from a claseical agency
model. Firs[, conaumption of performance is non-rivalrous. Second,
inscitu[.iona: conatraints and limited access to capital marketa
rather than risk averaion motivate the contract.15
potential projects differ? In a stylized world with
perfect markets and costless redistribution, all projects
can be ranked in terms of their net present value using the
international interest rate as the discount rate and market
prices for inputs and outputs. The choice between
competing projects is simply a production decision; the
only connection between projects and social welfare is via
the intertemporal budget constraint since all other effects
of the project can be altered by buying and selling goods
on the international market and costlessly redistributing
goods or income domestically. Assessing project
performance and ranking projects is straightforward under
these conditions.
As we move away from the stylized world, this
simplicity breaks down: consumption and production
decisions become intertwined. If access to international
capital markets is limited, the appropriate discount rate
in the net present value calculation is the social rate of
time preference of consumption since investment means less
consumption today. Similarly, if the government cannot
redistribute costlessly because of transactions costs, non-
tradeable goods and public goods, then the actual
distribution of project costs and benefits may influence
social welfare. If market prices are distorted due to
market imperfections or government intervention or if the
project provides a public good, opportunity costs must be
used in the net present value calculation.
This points out that the ranking of projects by net
present value will depend on preferences and that
systematic differences in preferences will lead to
systematic differences in rankings. The most systematic
difference between World Sank and borrower preferences is
the rate of time preference. The World Bank is typically
more far-sighted than its borrowers, lending for investment
rather than current consumption. It is concerned with a
narrower range of problems than is the borrowing16
government, namely long term investment. Other issues such
as current consumption, government budget shortfalls, and
foreign exchange shortages rank much lower on the World
Bank's list of priorities since they are "the government's
problem" not "the World Bank's problem." For exactly the
same reasons, the borrowing government places more
importance on current issues and less on long term
investment.
In addition to its responsibility to address current
issues, the borrowing government may have less admirable
motives for promoting current consumption at the expense of
future consumption. Such policies as urban food subsidies
and protection for certain industries may be politically
motivated. Even if benefits are to be distributed evenly,
short run benefits have great appeal since the political
life of the government of a less developed country is often
short and uncertain. There is a temptation to let the next
government pay the price.1ó
Sargaining and Projact Objectives
Differences between World Bank and borrower objectives
are relevant for project outcomes only if World Bank
objectives are reflected in the contract (the project
plan). Although projects are officially the borrowers' and
the World Bank does not force projects on unwilling
countries, the World Bank clearly does influence the
identification and design of projecta (see Section I)."
ia See Mosley (1987, chapter 4) for a diacusaion of the relative
preference of borrowers for consumption over investment, political
short-sightedness, and how the substitution of foreign aid-funded
investment for domestically-funded inveatment may increase
consumption.
Recently, the World Bank has been concerned with a lack of "borrower
ownerahip:" The lack of ownership directly reflects the
incorporation of world Bank objectives (as oppoaed to borrower
objectives) in the project plan.
The entire project approach to lending can be aeen as a method of
promoting World Bank objectives. Loans with no conditions,
immediate disburaement, and no attached project plan provide a more17
The degree to which a project reflects world Bank
rather than borrower preferences depends on the relative
bargaining power of two parties. The World Bank has
lending targets for individual countries, regions, and
sectors. If lending is "behind schedule" or if other
sources of capital are available, the borrowing country may
have an advantage in negotiations. For example, the
Republic of Korea might accept only projects which conform
exactly to its preferences. Countries with poor access to
international financial markets and with greater borrowing
needs (those with low GDP per capita levels, low growth,
and large deficits) have a weaker position and may
compromise on some projects.
In general, projects plans impose World Bank
preferences on the borrower, the degree of imposition
depending on the closeness of objectives and the relative
bargaining positions. At one extreme, the borrower may be
indifferent to the project and agree to the contract only
because of the "payment" of disbursed funds and the aid
component of the loan. At the other extreme, the borrower
may heartily endorse the project and would undertake it
even if World Bank funding were perfectly fungible.18 The
typical case is between these extremes with some divergence
between the actual project and the borrower's ideal. The
severity of the agency problem (i.e., incentive the
borrower has to deviates from the project plan) will depend
on how closely project goals align with borrower goals and
how well the World Bank can discern borrower actions.
efficient method of transferring reso~rcea. In principle, World
Bank project activities need not be tied to financial aid.
This raises the general iasue of fungibility. If the World Bank
funds a project which the borrower would have done without outside
funds, some other "marginal" pzoject or activity may be undertaken
with the freed resources. This may influence the World Bank's
choice of projects; it might only fund projecte which would not have
been undertaken otherwise.18
II.2 The Coat of Information
The second element of a principal-agent problem,
incomplete or imperfect information, is also apparent in
World Bank projects. World Bank staff are generally of the
opinion that information about projects is imperfect
despite monitoring of implementation and loan
conditionality compliance. This impression is confirmed by
ex post audits which often uncover new problems and by the
failure to cancel projects which are later judged
unsatisfactory. Of 465 projects rated unsatisfactory in
the past two decades, only 25 percent had substantial
cancellation.l' Though not all unsatisfactory projects
should have been canceled (since sunk costs enter the
rating process but are irrelevant when considering
cancellaticn), the cancellation rate would certainly be
higher if information about project implementation were
complete.
Why is information incomplete? Assuming it is an
unconstrained choice, incomplete information is the result
of balancing the marginal cost and the expected marginal
benefit of supervision. The balance should be reached
before full information if information is costly since
marginal cost is constant and the expected marginal benefit
is declining.Zo
xa
Calculated from a eample of 1796 projects for which all data were
available between 1972 and 1990. Fouz hundred and sixty-five
projecta were rated unsatiafactory; 115 of these had 25 percent or
more of the loan amount canceled, 47 had 50 percent or more
canceled. Projects with a small percentage of the loan canceled may
have been under-budget (ueually due to favorable changes in the
exchange zate) or may have dropped minor project components.
The marginal benefit of supervision ie should decline, at least past
some level of supervision, for two reasone. First, the 'amount" of
new information generated by additional auperviaion will decline
since the most flagrant violations will be easily detected. Second,
the value of additional information will decline past some point
aince the world Bank has only a limited ability to "punish" the
borrower. In the terminology of the principal-agent literature, the
participation constraint binds. Although Radner and Stiglitz (1984)
and Singh (1985) discuss increasing returns to information, these
arguments only apply close to no information. The Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1991) multi-task principal-agent model implies that the
marginal value of information increases with its breadth. In the19
However, incomplete information may be the result of a
direct limit on supervision rather than from a project-
level marginal condition. There are two reasons the World
Bank might limit supervision: domestic sovereignty and
borrower ownership. Beyond a certain point, additional
monitoring may interfere with the domestic affairs of the
government or be interpreted as over-stepping allowed
bounds. Excessive World Bank involvement also may weaken
the borrower's sense of responsibility for and commitment
to the project. In a repeated setting, excessive
supervision on one project may set a precedent, one which
shifts more of the responsibility for management to the
World Bank. To prevent setting precedents, the World Bank
may impose supervision limits which are not optimal in a
one project setting.
To summarize, World Bank information about borrower
actions appears to be incomplete or imperfect. This may be
a project-by-project optimal choice given the costs and
benefits of information or may arise from externally
imposed constraints. In either case, incomplete
information may be a rational choice, not simply a mistake.
Policy advice, therefore, may not be so simple as "Collect
more information."
II.3 Extreme Contracte
The final "existence" condition for an agency problem
is the exclusion of extreme contracts, namely unconditional
loans, no lending, and implementation by the World Bank.
The first two are clearly suboptimal within the framework
of the problem. Because World Bank and borrower
preferences over projects differ, unconditional lending
with lump-sum loan disbursement and no World Bank
current example, this argument has less force since the borrower's
objectives are not orthogonal to the World Bank's. If World Bank
supervision begins with the areas where objectivea differ moat and
then extends to less conteated aspecta of the project, diminishing
returns will occur.20
involvement in project planning or administration would
lead to projects which do not satisfy the World Bank's
objectives. No lending is suboptimal for both parties
since that option is always available and, in the cases we
examine, is not chosen. Lending with conditions is
revealed preferred to no lending.
Implementation by the World Bank may appear to be
preferable to both parties since implementation might
proceed more smoothly. However, the World Bank does not
consider implementation as one of its roles. The
institutional lexicon carefully denotes projecta as "WOrld
Bank funded" rather than simply "World Bank" and the phrase
"borrower ownership" is oft repeated.
There are three main reasons why the World Bank does
not implement projects. First, the World Bank was
chartered as a lending institution; it provides advice and
oversight to ensure that funds lent are used to promote
development but cannot take charge of implementation.Z'
Second, development of the borrower's domestic capabilities
to plan, implement and manage is one of the benefits of the
project. Finally, by maintaining some distance from the
project, the World Bank absolves itself of responsibility
for the outcome, re-enforcing the government's obligation
to repay the loan regardless of project performance. As
currently structured, the project concept and plan are
theoretically the borrower's and implementation is
ultimately the borrower's responaibility; hence, poor
outcomes are irrelevant to repayment. For these reasons
direct World Bank implementation is ruled out and the
principal-agent contract, with its second best outcome,
cannot be avoided.
" This must be viewed as a temporary impediment, however. If there
were a strong motive for taking a more active role in
implementation, the charter could be amended or re-interpreted (as
is the case with structuzal adjustment lending).21
II.4 Implicationa of the Agency Framework
According to the principal-agent framework, the degree
of the agency problem -- the extent to which information is
incomplete and the degree to which project and borrower
objectives diverge -- affects project performance through
its influence on borrower actions. The completeness of
information depends on the level of supervision together
with the inherent difficulty in detecting violations. The
divergence between project and borrower objectives depends
on the divergence between World Bank and borrower
objectives and on the relative bargaining power of the two
parties (i.e., their reservation utility levels). Thus,
the agency model predicts links between performance, on the
one hand, and the level of supervision, the divergence of
objectives and the bargaining power of the borrower, on the
other. In addition, the impact of supervision will depend
on the divergence of objectives and the bargaining power of
the borrower. When data measuring these variables are
available, the predictions may be testable.
In the principal-agent model, supervision generates
information about borrower actions or effort by uncovering
deviations from project plans, schedules, procurement
regulations, and legal covenants. More supervision
increases the probability of detecting violations.
Information about violations is used to determine
disbursement and to set standards for correcting problems.
In turn, the actual or anticipated implications of
supervision influence borrower actiona. If the level of
supervision is high, violations are more likely to be
detected and the expected cost of violations rises,
inducing the borrower to exert more effort (i.e., commit
fewer violations). Borrower effort, in turn, influences
project performance. Thus, with other variables fixed,
high supervision will lead to improved performance on
average. The empirical test of this statement is the
central focus of Kilby (1994).22
The greater the divergence between project and
borrower objectives, whatever the source, the lower
performance is likely to be. When project objectives do
not align well with borrower objectives, the borrower has
less incentive to apply the appropriate level of effort and
more incentive to deviate from the project plan. Although
the desire for full and timely disbursement and continued
good relations with the World Bank may have a somewhat off-
setting effect on the effort level, imperfect information
limits the effectiveness of these countervailing factors
since the probability of detection is less than one. Thus,
controlling for the impact of supervision and other
factors, performance is likely to decline as project and
borrower object~ves move apart.
Some observables may measure the disparity between
project and borrower objectives. These may be direct,
reflecting the closeness of project and borrower
objectives, or indirect, providing information about either
the proximíty of World Bank and borrower objectives or
relative bargaining strength. Examples of the first
variety are the percentage of the implementation period
completed and the percentage of the project financed
domestically. Examples of the second variety are the level
of development and the rate of growth of the borrowing
country.
World Bank and borrower objectives will tend to
converge as implementation progresses. Once resources are
fixed and immobile, the incentive to divert them to other
uses is weak because the cost of diversion is high. The
incremental cost of completing the project (and receiving
the benefits) declines once these initial investments are
sun~c. Likewise, as the benefit atream draws nearer,
differences in objectives due to different discount rates23
diminish. ~~
The convergence of objectives is illustrated by the
following numerical example. Consider two projects,
project NOW and project LATER. Project NOW requires an
investment of S1 each year for the first three years and
delivers benefits of S4 each year for the subsequent five
years. Project LATER requires an investment of S1 each year
for the first five years and delivers benefits of S4 each
year for the subsequent ten years. Suppose that the World
Bank's discount rate is ten percent and the borrower's is
twenty percent. Before the either project starts, the net
present values of projects NOW and LATER to the World Bank
are
~
N ~-S1 I 111) ~ S4' 111)
NPVue.o - ' c ' ~ c - 59.80
4 1 ~ 14 I ,
NPV~.o - ~, -51~~ lll) '~ S4~I 111) - 512.60
Hence, the World Bank prefers project LATER. However, the
borrower's preferences are the reverse:
NPVb,o -~-S1'I 1 I~ t~ S4`I 1 I~ - 55.80
~,0 1.2 ~,3 1.2
NPVc.o -~, -S1`1 1 f~ t~ S4sI 1' ~ - 54.50
~,0 1.2 ~,5 1.2
Suppose that the World Bank requires that ita funds be
spent on project LATER. After one year of investment, the
borrower's net present value of continuing project LATER ia
" Experience in developed countries suggesta an additional reason for
the convergence of objectives: political commitment to a project
may build as it progresses from plan to product.24
NPVb.~ -~-S1'I 1'~ t~ S4'( 1 I~ - 56.60
~,o ` 1. 2 ~.a 1 1. 2
Project NOW has not been started; its net present value is
still 55.80. The World Bank and the borrower's objectives
are now the same -- both wish to continue project LATER.
The increase in the net present value of project LATER is
due to two factors: sunk costs do not enter the
calculation (a locking-in effect) and project benefits are
discounted less since they are one year nearer (so that
differences in discount rates are less important). In this
example, the sunk cost accounts for a 50.50 change in the
NPV and less distant benefits account for a 51.60 change in
the NPV.
Project and borrower objectives are also closer in
projects with a high percentage of domestic financing.
This is clear in the limit when all financing is domestic.
In general, when more of the borrower's own money is at
stake, the aid component of the project is lower and the
borrower's opportunity cost is higher because funds come
from the current budget. Since less benefit is derived
from disbursement but the project is still acceptable to
the borrower (i.e., it satisfies the participation
constraint), the borrower must place more weight on project
performance and thus has a greater incentive to promote
performance. Therefore, borrower effort and hence
performance are expected to be higher in projects where the
percentage of domestic financing is higher.
World Bank and borrower objectives are likely to be
closer for borrowers with a higher level of development and
a faster growth rate of GDP per capita. These countries
are better able to postpone consumption and resist budget
pressures than countries with less robust economies; as a
result, the government's rate of time preference is likely25
to be lower, more nearly matching that of the World Bank.Z'
The level of development and rate of growth also
indicate the bargaining position of the borrower.
Countries with strong, growing economies are likely to have
better access to international capital markets (or can
generate domestic investible surplus) and hence will be
less dependent on World Bank funds. The existence of
outside options strengthens their bargaining position and
hence such countries as less likely to accept projects
which do not fully reflect their own objectives.
The agency framework also elucidates conditions in
which supervision will have a greater effect on
performance: the greater the agency problem, the greater
the effect of supervision. When the agency problem is more
extreme, the number and degree of violations is likely to
be higher and hence a given level of supervision is likely
to identify more violations. This implies that supervision
will have a greater impact on performance early in the
implementation period, when the percent of domestic
financing is low, or when the level of development and the
growth rate of GDP per capita are low. In estimations, the
relative impact of supervision on performance under
different conditions would be investigated by interacting
the supervision variable with other variables.2'
When the severity of the agency problem does not vary
systematically, the impact of supervision will not vary
systematically. The component of supervision emphasized by
the agency model is monitoring; the actual task of
monitoring is relatively constant between projects since
The type of government (democracy, autocracy) and its life
expectancy might also be useful indicatora.
The link between the effectiveness of supervision and the severity
of the agency problem asaumea that the ability to "punish" the agent
doea not decline as objectives diverge. This is the case if
punishment means withholding diebursement. This may not be the case
if, for example, puniahment includes limiting future acceas to
funds. If objectives are eufficiently different, the borrower may
care very little about future interactions.26
much of it takes place at World Bank headquarters and
involves paperwork (checking expense statements against
plans and projections, auditing accounts, etc.). Thus,
unless the agency problem varies across region and sector,
the impact of supervision is likely to be constant across
these dimensions.27
III. The Cooperative Model
A cooperative view of World Bank-borrower interaction
may be appropriate since the interaction is purely
voluntary and clearly premised on a commonality of
interests. At the most direct level, the World Bank's
charter is altruistic and hence borrower welfare is a
central concern. However, cooperation can be pushed one
step further. Gauthier (1990) and James (1995) stress a
commonality between the immediate institutional interests
of the World Bank and the bureaucratic objectives of
implementing agencies within the borrowing government. The
result may be collusion, possibly to the detriment of the
interests of the World Bank's shareholders or the citizens
of the recipient country.
Even excluding collusion, there are many possible
variants of cooperative behavior. The World Bank and the
borrower may have the same objects or the two parties may
simply select project objectives (as outlined in a project
plan) and follow these. In the latter case, the process of
selecting a project may involve compromise on one or both
sides; this compromise may be based on "fair sharing rules"
or on the relative bargaining strengths of the parties.
Similarly, the costs of the project may be divide according
to different mechanisms. The costs to the World Bank are
the percentage of the project's cost financed by the World
Bank loan, the amount of preparation done by the World
Bank, and the amount of supervision done by the World
Bank . 35
The common element of all these interpretations of
cooperative behavior is that once a project plan is
" The loan amount may not entez negatively in the World Bank's
objective function since it may prefer more lending to less lending.
However, given a fixed loan amount, it prefers larger projects to
smaller projects as is evident from the required borrower
contribution and the expansion of projects co-financed with other
international inatitutions. The percentage of the project financed
captures these two considerations.28
selected, both parties follow it.26 As a consequence,
there is no role for asymmetric information during
implementation and only technical issues influence project
performance. In effect, the layer of incentive problems
and information asymmetries is stripped away, leaving only
the influence of "fundamentals." In a cooperative model
implementation is a series of technical problems while in a
noncooperative model there are, in addition, incentive
problems.
The role of supervision is very different in the two
models. As was discussed in the previous section, in a
noncooperative principal-agent model the monitoring
component of World Bank supervision influences project
performance. However, in a cooperative model, asymmetric
information during implementation has no function and hence
the monitoring aspect of supervision is irrelevant to
project performance. Instead, the emphasis of supervision
should be on assistance (management advising and technical
assistance); if supervision has a positive impact, it
should be from these elements.
This section proceeds in two stages. First, I examine
the possible impact of project characteristics and economic
factors on project performance. This discussion is cursory
since these are largely technical aspects of implementation
on which I have little to add. The main purpose is to re-
examine factors considered in the previous section from a
technícal rather than incentive angle. Second, I consider
the impact of the assistance component of World Bank
supervision on project performance. From an empirical
point of view, the key distinction is between the impact of
supervision on performance (which is likely to be positive)
and the measurable impact of World Bank supervision on
performance (which may be negligible).
" As in cooperative game theory, the agreement is binding though no
individually rational reason or enforcement mechanism is offezed.29
III.1 Technical Determinanta of Performance
Projects are complex and diverse; enumerating the
technical factors that influence their performance is not
the goal of this section. Rather, I revisit those factors
discussed in the previous section so as to compare
technical implications with incentive implications. I
consider the stage of implementation, the source of project
funds, the level of development and the growth rate.
Even from a purely technical point of view,
performance may vary with the stage of implementation. The
early stages of a project are generally the most crucial
since much of the activity and investment happens early on.
With more happening, more problems can arise at this stage
than at later stages. Once a problem is identified,
efforts will be made by both the World Bank and the
borrower to correct the problem. If initial problems are
solved faster than new problems arise, the resulting
pattern is declining performance at the early stages of a
project and gradual improvement thereafter.
There is no clear reason why the source of funds
(e.g., the percentage of World Bank financing) would be
linked to performance. Since the cooperative model assumes
that project plans are followed, the source of funds cannot
influence implementation. It may be related to the type of
project but so long as other project characteristica
(region and sector) are considered, we do not expect any
technologically induced link between performance and the
source of funds.
Both the level of development and the growth rate of
[he economy are likely to be positively link to project
performance. Development projects share many attributes
with other investment activities. For example, both types
of investments perform better when markets function well,
when physical and social infrastructure are developed, and
when the government deficit is low. Since both the level
of development and the growth rate give an aggregate30
measure of how other investments perform in a particular
environment, they should also have some predictive power
for the performance of development projects.
There are many other possible generalizations about
expected patterns in project performance; however, the
purpose of this section is to compare technical
implications and incentive implications about the influence
of four factors. There is agreement on three of these: on
average, project performance will be higher in the later
stages of implementation and in countries which are
relatively developed or experiencing rapid growth.
However, there is no technical reason why the source of
funds should be related to performance.
III.2 Superviaion se Asaistance
Two factors determine the observable relation between
the assistance components of World Bank supervision
(management advising and technical assistance) and project
performance: technical issues and substitutability.
Arguments about technical issues are similar to those
presented above and will be sketched only. Substitutability
of other sources of assistance is, however, an important
concern since data on this assistance are not available.
The positive impact of management advising and
technical assistance is self-evident: within reasonable
bounds, more inputs result in more output. The conditions
under which such assistance has a greater impact on
performance are governed by technical characteristics of
the project and hence there may be considerable
heterogeneity across projects. While monitoring is a
relatively homogeneous activity, management advising and
te~hnical asaistance incorporate a much wider range of
activities. Furthermore, these activities are likely to
vary dramatically across sectors and regions. Technical
assistance in a financial aector project in Southeast Asia
may require only a revíew of books and procedures in a very31
centralized location but have a marked impact on subsequent
project performance. In contrast, technical assistance for
a veterinary extension project for nomadic herdsmen in
North Africa may involve extensive travel and difficulties
in communication. Though also quite useful, this type of
assistance work is considerably more time consuming. Thus,
we expect the impact of management advising and technical
assistance to vary by region and by type of project.
As with monitoring, early assistance is likely to have
a greater impact than later assistance. The purpose of
assistance is to identify problems and solutions. Although
the identification of problems is still possible late in a
project, fixing these problems becomes more and more
difficult. The later in the project, the more irreversible
are the previous decisions. Hence, the effectiveness of
assistance in solving problems is likely to decline over
time.
Assistance is also likely to have a smaller impact in
large projects though this prediction is somewhat clouded.
Simply because of their size, large projects require more
assistance to improve their performance than otherwise
identical small projects. However, large and amall
projects may differ systematically even in the same region
and sector. Small projects more often embody newer, less
well-known approaches; expert advisors may be learning as
they advise.
We can also venture a generalization about the how the
effectiveness of asaistance varies with the project's
external environment, e.g., the country's level of
development and economic growth rate. In a conducive
environment, a greater percentage of project problems will
be internal and hence fixable. However, in a more
difficult environment, a greater percentage of project
problems will be externally caused and cannot be completely
remedied. Hence, assistance will have a greater impact in
relatively developed, growing economies.32
While all these statements are reasonable, none of
them may be evident when analyzing World Bank project data.
The above discusses the impact of management advising and
technical assistance on project performance as distinct
from the observable impact of World Bank management
advising and technical assistance. Although the positive
influence of assistance is self-evident, the link between
World Bank assistance and project performance is not.
Because substitutes exist, more World Bank inputs do not
necessarily indicate more overall inputs. Substitutes
include the services of international consultants and the
government's own staff.Z'
If the level of World Bank input is low, a rational
borrower would seek supplemental assistance from other
sources. Under this rational agent hypothesis, World Bank
assistance acts as a lump-sum subsidy: it is provided
without charge and substitutes for a costly input. The
distribution of this subsidy need not be related to the
overall level of assistance a project receives. Instead,
distribution may depend on the project manager, on other
demands on fixed resources, on trends within the World
Bank, on the amount of experience the World Bank has with
that type of project, or on the ability of the borrower to
do its own supervision. If the level of borrower
supervision is observed in advance, World Bank assistance
may be a residual. Hence, there is no necessary
correlation between World Bank assistance and project
performance.
" Some borrower self-aupervision may be complementary to World Bank
eupervieion if government etaff or conaultanta serve as
intermediaries between World Bank eupervisors and the actual
implementors of the project. The relevant point is that governments
can obtain substitutes for World Bank supervision when the benefits
of additional supervision outweigh the costs.33
ZV. Concluaion
The two models of World Bank-borrower relations
developed in this paper paint very different pictures of
project implementation. In the cooperative model,
technical factors rather than incentive problems determine
project performance. The only twist added by the existence
of two parties is one of ineasurement due to the lack of
data on management and technical assistance activities of
the borrower. In contrast, the existence of two parties
plays a critical role in the adversarial model. Divergent
incentives and incomplete information generate additional
implementation problems. Both the evolution of performance
over time and the relation between project characteristics
and performance are influenced by these agency problems.
The adversarial model links the monitoring component of
world Bank supervision to project performance; this link
should be measurable since no substitutes (observable or
otherwise) exist for World Bank monitoring.
The adversarial model proposes addítional sources of
implementation problems since all characteristics of the
cooperative model are still present. Thus, both views
agree that, for technical reasons, performance improves
during the latter part of project implementation and
performance is better in stronger economies (those with a
high level of development and a high growth rate). Both
suggest that the influence of the assiatance component of
World Bank supervision on performance may not be
measurable; however, if it is, it will be heterogeneous,
varying with region, aector, size of project, level of
development and stage of implementation. The additional
implications of the adversarial model are that the aource
of project funding will influence performance and that the
monitoring component of World Bank auperviaion will have an
measurable impact on project performance. This impact will
be stronger in the initial stages of the project and in34
projects with a higher proportion of non-domestic financing
but will be relatively homogeneous otherwise. The
adversarial model also proposes additional reasons why
performance will be better in the later stages of
implementation and in countries with a high level of
development and economic growth.
The best test of the cooperative model against the
adversarial model is to examine the impact of World Bank
monitoring on project performance. The cooperative model
implies that there is no impact while the adversarial model
implies a measurable positive impact. Unfortunately,
current World Bank practices do not explicitly distinguish
between types of supervision. If such a test is to be
carried out, some indirect method of separating types of
supervision must be attempted.
A second approach is to examine how the influence of
World Bank supervision varies across projects. The
influence of the assistance component of World Bank
supervision on performance will be heterogeneous across
region, sector and macroeconomic conditions if it is
measurable. A less variable connection between supervision
and performance indicates that the influence of World Bank
assistance is not measurable and that the measured
influence should be attributed to monitoring. Again, if
monitoring influences performance, agency model stemming
from an adversarial view is supported.
A final indicator of the applicability of the agency
model is the relevance of the source of funds. Controlling
for the influence of project characteriatics, the source of
funds should have no influence on project performance
according to the cooperative model. In contrast, the
adversarial model suggests that domestic incentive problems
are proportional to the percentage of funding provided by
international sources. The key isaue here is adequately
controlling for other project characteristics since these
may depend on the negotiation process which also determines35
the international contribution.
In addition to the above implications for empirical
research, several of the ideas developed in this discussion
have direct policy relevance. Perhaps the most useful
aspect of the discussion of management advising and
technical assistance is that it clarifies the nature of
this type of World Bank supervision: it is a lump-sum
subsidy. Recognizing it as such should influence the
choice of the type, level and distribution of World Bank
supervision.
The existence of an agency problem is almost certain
based on the evidence presented in Section II. The real
question for empirical research is the importance of this
incentive problem -- is it minor or does it have a
substantial impact on project performance? If the
incentive problem is substantial, attention should be
focused on reducing it.
One method is to reduce the gap between project and
borrower objectives. Section I identified various
attributes of the preparation process which allow World
Bank rather than borrower objectives to ahape project
plans. Section II outlined reasons why objectives might be
different, some of which are fundamental but others are
arbitrary. Better communication between the World Bank and
its borrowers might result in better agreement on
objectives. Modification of the preparation proceas to
allow greater borrower influence on project selection and
design would reduce agency problems during implementation
and thereby improve performance.2a
A second method of reducing agency problems is to
improve World Bank gathering and use of information about
project implementation. Section II examined the link
between monitoring and performance and derived conditions
" This is by no meane an unprecedented concluaion; many observera of
development aid advocate increased recipient involvement in
selection and design of projects.36
under which monitoring would be more effective. In
addition, the World Bank must use that information
effectively. A tighter link between the findings of
monitoring and actions taken by the World Bank would result
in better performance since borrower actions are based on
expected costs rather than simply on the probability of
detection. Enforcement of loan conditionalities and
project schedules is crucial for maintaining the
effectiveness of monitoring.Z'
A third method is radical institutíonal reform. As
noted in Section II, institutional constraints are
ultimately the source of the agency problem. Limits on
supervision and the prohibition of direct World Bank
implementation, at one extreme, and the project format of
lending, at the other, exclude alternative arrangements
which would eliminate incentive and informational problems.
Radical institutional reform might reduce agency problems
and improve project performance but would only be warranted
if agency problems are extreme.
" Mosley et al. (1991) document many cases in Structural Adjustment
programs where violationa are detected but tranches released
nonetheless.37
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